

# The University of Chicago Committee on Communication, 1942, 1948–1959

*The Life and Death of an Interdisciplinary Field*

Jefferson D. Pooley

*Muhlenberg College*

[pooley@muhlenberg.edu](mailto:pooley@muhlenberg.edu)

[jeffpooley.com](http://jeffpooley.com)

*Paper presented at the 8th workshop*

*Transforming Homo Economicus*

*14 June 2024, Cy Cergy University*

# *The University of Chicago Committee on Communication, 1942, 1948–1959*

Jefferson D. Pooley

2024

IN THE LATE WINTER of 1958, Bernard Berelson gave a talk to a student group at the University of Chicago. Berelson—the library scientist turned Ford Foundation rainmaker—was addressing the Communication Club, run by master’s students at the university’s Committee on Communication. Berelson had established the Committee ten years earlier, before leaving to direct Ford’s Behavioral Sciences Program. He had returned to the Chicago faculty that fall, and the students had invited him to address the club.

Berelson’s talk was on “The State of Communication Research,” the students’ chosen field of study. He read what amounted to a eulogy: “My theme is that, as for communication research, the state is withering away.” The field’s leading figures, he said, had moved on to other topics. The great ideas that gave the field “so much vitality ten and twenty years ago,” he said, “have to a substantial extent worn out.” No new ideas “of comparable magnitude” have taken their place.<sup>1</sup>

The students, gathered to hear their program’s founder, must have been stunned. They wouldn’t have known that, a week earlier, the university had voted to dissolve their Committee. If they had been aware that Berelson himself had stood by, opting against making a case for the Committee’s survival, they might have been angry.

At any rate, Berelson was right: The social scientists working on communication topics had, by then, largely moved on. The closure of the Committee on Communication was a local index of what Berelson sensed, correctly, as a field-wide ending. It is no coincidence that the wider “behavioral sciences” movement, so closely identified with Berelson, was itself dissipating in these years. The other psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists hitched by war to the science of persuasion—Berelson’s fellow communication researchers—had, in the first postwar decade, formed the nucleus of the self-anointed “behavioral sciences.” The two formations—communications research and its behavioral sciences enclosure—were breaking apart under the same overlapping pressures, including a shift in the patronage system and U.S. social science’s staggering expansion in scale.<sup>2</sup>

So Berelson’s talk was on to something: His colleagues were moving on, and the Chicago Committee would soon disband. But he mis-

<sup>1</sup> Communication Club flyer, March 6, 1958, folder 22, box 172, Ernest Watson Burgess Papers, Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library (EWB hereafter). The quotes are from the published version of the paper. Berelson, “The State of Communication Research,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (1959): 1, 6.

understood what was happening. Downstate in Urbana-Champaign and in journalism schools across the country, scholar-entrepreneurs were erecting the scaffolding for an organized discipline. Berelson's wake for the field was really more like a handoff—to legitimacy-starved professional schools of journalism. That's where communication research took durable hold. And the journalism schools had the undergraduate enrollments to make the label stick.

The Committee on Communication was a weak example of the form, even by Chicago standards. The Committee never won much support from administrators. And Berelson's departure for Ford in 1951 left it rudderless. But the Committee's closure eight years later was, more than anything, an expression of its field. Communication research was born in exigency, in the run-up to World War II. Its practitioners were bonded by shared service to the country's propaganda and morale bureaucracy. In the late 1940s the field's central figures, Berelson included, were in war service again, helping the national security state defeat the new Soviet enemy.<sup>3</sup>

By the time Berelson gave his talk to the Chicago students, conditions had changed. The constellation of military, State Department, and foundation funding that had bound the field's social scientists was, by the late 1950s, breaking up. Most of the field's leading figures had no real attachment to communication research. Berelson, in this respect, was an exception: He was shaken by the field's slow dissolution, made much worse by his Ford program's abrupt closure in 1957. His remarks to the Chicago students were delivered in disappointment.

The main claim of this paper is that the Chicago Committee on Communication was an expression, in fractal form, of communication research in the middle-third of the twentieth century. The Committee registered the birth and death of an interdisciplinary formation—one that was unstable and tethered to war. In a meaningful sense, the Chicago committee system's interstitial character was purpose-built for communication research. It is an ephemeral form, suited for circumstantial groupings that will, with time, whither away.<sup>4</sup>

### 1. *The Committee Chairs: Douglas Waples and Bernard Berelson*

There were, in fact, two Committees on Communication—the first the model for the second. Established in 1942, the Committee on Communications and Public Opinion was stillborn, dismantled later that year as its chief sponsor, library scientist Douglas Waples, joined the government's propaganda bureaucracy. After the war, Berelson—Waples's former student—lobbied for a revival. By 1948, he won approval for the Committee on Communication, which in most respects resembled its war-era predecessor.

<sup>2</sup> On the behavioral sciences as a self-understood vanguard of U.S. social scientists—all the mainline disciplines except economics—forged in shared World War II service, maintained through funder-enabled networks of the early Cold War, and characterized by a mix of nomothetic confidence and aspirational scientism—see Pooley, "What Were the Behavioral Sciences?" *SocArXiv* (working paper), December 17, 2021; and Pooley, "A 'Not Particularly Felicitous' Phrase: A History of the 'Behavioral Sciences' Label," *Serendipities. Journal for the Sociology and History of the Social Sciences* 1, no. 1 (2016).

<sup>3</sup> For a historiographical overview, see Pooley, "The New History of Mass Communication Research," in *The History of Media and Communication Research: Contested Memories*, ed. David W. Park and Pooley (New York: Peter Lang, 2008).

<sup>4</sup> The only article-length treatment of the Committee is Karin Wahl-Jorgensen, "How Not to Found a Field: New Evidence on the Origins of Mass Communication Research," *Journal of Communication* 54 (2004). The article, directed at fellow communication researchers, is a useful source. Shorter treatments appear in Gary D. Jaworski, "Goffman's Interest in Spies and Espionage: The University of Chicago Context," *Symbolic Interaction* 44, no. 2 (2021): 401–4; and Arvind Rajagopal, "Communicationism: Cold War Humanism," *Critical Inquiry* 46, no. 2 (2020): 366–73.

Waples (1893–1978) had joined the university in 1925, and helped to establish its Graduate Library School (GLS) three years later.<sup>5</sup> He was a key architect of the school’s self-image as a scholarly outpost, set against the profession’s apprenticeship training model. Waples championed what he called, in a then-novelty, “library science,” as the school’s charge. In a prominent 1929 talk, he outlined the GSL’s “single most important responsibility”: to meet the “standards of scholarship and research” maintained by Chicago’s other graduate units.<sup>6</sup> Waples’s address was published in the inaugural issue of the GSL’s new, high-profile journal, *The Library Quarterly*—underwritten, like the school itself, by the Carnegie Corporation. These and other programmatic statements, together with his role as interim GSL dean in the early 1930s, made Waples a living symbol of the new “science of librarianship.” In the controversy that ensued—pitting the librarian’s art against its would-be science—he was the named target of the profession’s traditionalists.<sup>7</sup>

Waples aspired for library science, and his own subfield of reading studies, to be accepted as a legitimate social science. He spent the 1930s building the case for an interdisciplinary social science of reading, in a train of articles and a pair of monographs marked by charts-and-tables scientism. The first, *What People Want to Read About* (1931), was notable for its Chicago-trained co-author, Ralph Tyler. An education scholar then at Ohio State, Tyler would—upon his late-1930s return to Chicago—play an important role in the life of the two Chicago Committees on Communication, as an administrative climber and postwar Dean of the Social Sciences Division.<sup>8</sup>

Waples did not, at least initially, find many collaborators in his field-building project. By 1938 he was still issuing prospective calls for a cross-disciplinary “sociology of reading,” predicated on the “systematic collaboration of a wide range of specialists.”<sup>9</sup> It was around this time that the new field of communications research was coalescing, under the sponsorship of the Rockefeller Foundation.<sup>10</sup> The backdrop was the outbreak of war in Europe. Waples, in effect, folded his reading research program into what had, almost overnight, become a cross-medium community of study. He fashioned himself, in this late-1930s moment of transition, as a specialist in print communications—working alongside specialists in radio, newspaper, and film. He identified, from then on, as a communications researcher. Trained in education, a self-made library scientist, Waples had traded both for the “communications” label. He spent the balance of his Chicago career building the new field via the university’s unusual—and fragile—committee system, before retiring in 1957.

His chief partner in the enterprise was Bernard Berelson (1912–1979). Berelson joined the GSL as Waples’s doctorate student in 1937,

<sup>5</sup> John V. Richardson, *Spirit of Inquiry: The Graduate Library School at Chicago, 1921–51* (Chicago: American Library Association, 1982), 52–54; and George Kamberelis and Marta K. Albert, “Douglas Waples (1893–1978): Crafting the Well-Read Public,” in *Shaping the Reading Field: The Impact of Early Reading Pioneers, Scientific Research, and Progressive Ideas*, ed. Susan E. Israel and E. Jennifer Monaghan (Newark, DE: International Reading Association, 2007). On the GLS’s founding orientation to scholarship, Carnegie Corporation underwriting, and Waples’s interventions to maintain a research mission after the founding dean’s abrupt retirement, see Richardson, *Spirit of Inquiry*, chap. 3, esp. 66–70.

<sup>6</sup> Waples, “The Graduate Library School at Chicago,” *Library Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (1931): 26–27.

<sup>7</sup> Richardson, *Spirit of Inquiry*, 90–98.

<sup>8</sup> Waples and Tyler, *What People Want to Read About: A Study of Group Interests and a Survey of Problems in Adult Reading* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931). Tyler had followed Charters to Ohio State in the late 1920s, before returning to the Education Department in 1938.

<sup>9</sup> Waples, *People and Print: Social Aspects of Reading in the Depression*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), 56.

<sup>10</sup> Throughout the period under study, “communication research” and “communications research”—with the “s”—were used interchangeably. This paper follows that practice.

after earning a library science master's at the University of Washington.<sup>11</sup> Berelson was, if anything, still more energetic and ambitious than the entrepreneurial Waples. Berelson was the main force behind the second Chicago Committee, and adopted the "communications researcher" identity with like-minded brio. His 1941 dissertation, a study of print media's effects on U.S. public opinion, launched him into the small, freshly minted fraternity of self-identified communications scholars. The project, directed by Waples and commissioned by Austrian emigre Paul Lazarsfeld, was conceived in the hothouse of pre-Pearl Harbor communications research, funded by an extraordinary Rockefeller Foundation campaign, begun in 1939, to boost domestic morale and counter Axis propaganda. That Rockefeller-coordinated effort gave birth to "communications research" as a named field, and was, too, the immediate backdrop to the first Chicago Committee.

Berelson, like Waples and hundreds of other social scientists, served in a series of government posts during the war. In 1944, he joined Lazarsfeld's Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University, where he co-authored, with Lazarsfeld, the landmark media-cum-voting monograph *The People's Choice* (1944)—which included his dissertation project as a chapter.<sup>12</sup> Berelson soon returned to Chicago, as the GSL's new dean, but maintained his affiliation with Lazarsfeld's Bureau over the subsequent 15 years—the lifespan, roughly speaking, of the second Committee. In 1951 Berelson left Chicago, and the second committee, to helm the Ford Foundation's new Behavioral Sciences Program. It was the ignominious shuttering of that program, in 1957, that brought a disillusioned Berelson back to Chicago—the same year that Waples retired. Berelson—once the communication field's most vigorous champion—kept his distance from the then-struggling Committee. He left to direct Lazarsfeld's Bureau at Columbia in 1959—the same year that the weakened Committee on Communication officially closed, this time for good.

Many of the stories recounted in the history of social science literature center on department and discipline. Here, in the communication case, we have *committee* and *field*—two looser formations that, as it were, rose and fell in tandem. The chapter shows how the Chicago committee was a portrait-in-miniature of the wider field of communication research. Both were made, and then undone, by war: World War II first, and all over again with the early Cold War. The two Committees on Communication—the stillborn 1942 installment, and its postwar (1948–1959) successor—fell apart in the same patterned way, as their key figures left Chicago to staff propaganda campaigns, first against the Nazis and then the Soviets.

<sup>11</sup> Isabel S. Grossner, Oral History Interview of Bernard Berelson, Columbia University Oral History Research Office, 1967, 6; and David Sills, "Bernard Berelson: Behavioral Scientist," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 17 (1981): 306.

<sup>12</sup> Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice: How The Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign* (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1944).

My claim is that the committee form, more or less unique to Chicago, was a good match for contingent, cross-disciplinary coalitions like the upstart field of communication research. Hutchins, who inherited the form when he took up the Chicago presidency in 1929, had moved to quickly expand what became something like a committee *system*. His explicit aim was to undermine department siloes, in concert with the university's new divisional structure, established the same year. Whether the committee form actually fostered the department-weakening cross-disciplinarity that Hutchins had as his goal is an open question. As the other chapters show, the form itself was notably heterogeneous, marked by several axes of difference, among them external funding, degree-granting authority, staffing, and standalone faculty appointments.

Bracketing that diversity for the sake of a general observation, my view is that the Chicago committee, as a unit of academic organization, is marked by fragility. Committees have tended toward brief lifespans, with International Relations, Human Development, and Social Thought as rule-proving exceptions. The Chicago committee, as a form, is a contingent and time-bound convenience, one hitched—in existential terms—to the fortunes of its faculty champions. Is this ephemerality by design, or at least an institutional expectation—that committees come and go? Perhaps, but that has been their fate regardless, for most of the form's twentieth century examples. In the Committee on Communication case, the field that it helped name was, in morphological terms, a scaled-up likeness. Their fates, the field's and the committee's, were intertwined. Both gave way to the solidier stuff of schools and departments, and their key resource, the undergraduate major.

## 2. *The Rockefeller Foundation and the Birth of "Communications Research"*

Until 1939, there was no such thing as "communications research," as a named field of study. The story of how the Rockefeller Foundation ushered the field into existence has been told elsewhere. In brief, Rockefeller underwrote the academic uptake of sampling-based polling methods in the mid-1930s, seeding a journal (*Public Opinion Quarterly*) and a handful of research shops. The key Rockefeller figure was John Marshall, a medievalist by training and associate director of the foundation's Humanities Division. Marshall's concern was the new medium of radio, in the bitter aftermath of the Communication Act of 1934. He fixed on opinion polling, newly prominent after George Gallup's public demonstration of representative sampling in the 1936 presidential election. Marshall latched onto polling methods

as a way to mend fences after the Communication Act, which had favored the big broadcasters over advocates for educational radio. In effect, he stepped in to broker a compromise between educationalists and the networks. His main strategy was to underwrite polling studies of radio audiences, with the aim to demonstrate to CBS and NBC that educational fare would draw big audiences.<sup>13</sup>

The most important research operation that Marshall created was the Office of Radio Research (ORR) at Princeton University. Working with Hadley Cantril, a Princeton psychologist and polling enthusiast, and Frank Stanton, the CBS research director (and the network's future president), Marshall recruited the emigre Austrian psychologist Paul F. Lazarsfeld to direct the ORR, launched in 1937. The story of Lazarsfeld's clashes with Cantril, his employment of Frankfurt exile Theodor Adorno, and his improbable emergence, after World War II, as a prominent Columbia sociologist, has received extensive attention in the literature. The point to stress here is that the foundation's initiatives, notably the ORR and *Public Opinion Quarterly*, served as a cross-disciplinary crossroads. It was a small world, with a web of collaborations and friendships that would—over the subsequent two decades—become denser still. If there was a common label, it was “public opinion research,” with radio audiences as one shared object of study.<sup>14</sup> Two University of Chicago figures, political scientist Harold Lasswell<sup>15</sup> and sociologist Samuel Stouffer,<sup>16</sup> were charter members of this Rockefeller-sponsored fraternity—forged in webs of overlapping projects, sponsored conferences, and side-by-side editorial service at the *Quarterly*.

It was likely that Lasswell introduced Waples to Rockefeller's Marshall, who in 1939 asked both men to join a monthly “Communications Seminar” series in New York City.<sup>17</sup> The Seminar was of decisive importance to the formation of a self-understood “communications research” field; the group's meetings through 1940 birthed the label itself. The Seminar was also the direct source for the first iteration of the Chicago Committee on Communication, launched two years later. Waples's plan, that is, was a straightforward extension, a local implementation, of the blueprint that he helped draw in the Rockefeller meetings. By the time the group issued its final report in 1940, both he and Berelson had largely abandoned their library-science identities for the new field.

Marshall had planned the Communications Seminar as an extension of his mid-1930s campaign to use radio studies to build bridges between educators and commercial broadcasters. He threw away that plan at the group's first meeting, held on September 2, 1939, the day after German tanks rolled into Poland. Marshall re-oriented the Seminar to the war emergency.<sup>18</sup> Over ten meetings through 1940,

<sup>13</sup> Marshall, like the Humanities Division director David H. Stevens, was an English professor. Trained as a medievalist at Harvard, Marshall left his teaching post at the university in 1933 to join the Division, which had been created in the foundation's reorganization that year. On Marshall's pivotal role, see, for example, William J. Buxton, “The Political Economy of Communications Research,” in *Information and Communication in Economics*, ed. Robert E. Babe (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994); and J. Michael Sproule, *Propaganda and Democracy: The American Experience of Media and Mass Persuasion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chaps. 5–6.

<sup>14</sup> Jean M. Converse, *Survey Research in the United States: Roots and Emergence 1890–1960* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), chap. 4.

<sup>15</sup> The star product of Chicago's Political Science program under Charles Merriam, Lasswell established his reputation with the 1927 publication of his dissertation on World War I propaganda. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (New York: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Company, 1927). In this and subsequent work through to the mid-1930s, he positioned propaganda as an indispensable tool of modern governance. In the early 1930s he codified his approach to what he would soon call “content analysis”—the systematic study of media messages. *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*, published in 1935, was the full Lasswellian program, including the notoriously runic argot that he deployed—with limited uptake—for the rest of his life. Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York: Whittlesey House, 1935). When Hutchins blocked his promotion in 1938, Lasswell resigned his post and left for Washington. See Mark C. Smith, *Social Science in the Crucible: The American Debate over Objectivity and Purpose, 1918–41* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994), 243–44.

the dozen or so social-scientist members drafted more than thirty memos and reports, with the explicit aim to inform U.S. morale-and-propaganda policy, against the real-time backdrop of the rapid Nazi conquest of Europe. The group was, at the same time, the nerve center of an extraordinary bureaucracy-in-waiting assembled by Marshall in 1939 and 1940, in quiet coordination with a Roosevelt administration that could not, for political reasons, mount its own official effort.

Lasswell was the Communications Seminar's de facto leader. The group's other members were largely, though not exclusively, drawn from the ranks of public opinion researchers, and included Waples, Lazarsfeld, and Cantril.<sup>19</sup> The Seminar, which met at Rockefeller's New York headquarters in semi-secrecy, centered on two competing, but ultimately merged, agendas: to map out the scientific study of mass communication, but also to design an extra-governmental plan for combatting Nazi propaganda and mobilizing war support. The dominant view, as documented in the group's materials, was that the two aims were compatible—an "ideology of service and science," in J. Michael Sproule's later description.<sup>20</sup>

The group's deliberations were drenched in no-time-to-waste crisis talk. "Whether one likes it or not," reads an early memo, "a state of full emergency necessitates the deliberate formation and control of public opinion." The 1939 memo, drafted by Lasswell, glossed existing research—including Lazarsfeld's and Waples'—and proposed a "central coordinating agency" to guide a sweeping national program of proposed studies.<sup>21</sup> The memo also bears the first known reference to "communication research" in the English language: "One of the fundamental requirements for integrated research," Lasswell wrote in reference to the coordinating agency, "is the development of an adequate conceptual structure for the entire field of communication research."<sup>22</sup>

The rapid Nazi gains in the spring and summer of 1940 plainly rattled the group. The Seminar's members issued a July report, based on a June meeting just days after Paris fell to the Wehrmacht. The signed report ("for private circulation only") is a muscular brief for emergency opinion control, justified by the civilizational stakes. In place of Lasswell's windy neologisms, the report is framed with portentous, plain-English alarm:

If America is to meet the necessity of adapting to a changing world, and at the same time preserve the way of life that Americans hold dear, that adaptation must be achieved with public consent. In securing that consent, public opinion and the influences affecting [sic] will be crucial. We believe [...] that for leadership to secure that consent will require

<sup>16</sup> Stouffer, a William Ogburn student who joined the Chicago faculty in 1935, was an early participant in the field, working alongside Lazarsfeld on the study of radio audiences in the late 1930s. He left Chicago for the Army's Research Branch before the first Committee was launched, but his quantitative commitments exemplified the field's intellectual temper.

<sup>17</sup> Waples and Lasswell had co-authored an idiosyncratic book in the mid-1930s. Waples and Lasswell, *National Libraries and Foreign Scholarship* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936). How the two met, and the nature of their relationship at Chicago prior to the collaboration on the book, is difficult to establish, partly because both men's personal papers were accidentally destroyed (Lasswell's, famously, in transit from Chicago to Washington in 1938; and Waples in a 1961 fire at his California home, two years after the Committee on Communication closed). Marshall's acquaintance with Waples may, alternatively, have come via Waples's old collaborator, Ralph Tyler. Marshall, in his official diary, records meeting with Waples at Chicago in 1937, to canvass Waples for his opinion of a project on reading that Tyler (then still at Ohio State) had pitched to the foundation. Marshall, *Diary 7 January - 30 July 1937*, June 15, 1937, p. 365, Rockefeller Foundation Records, Rockefeller Archive Center (RFR hereafter).

<sup>18</sup> Brett Gary, "Communication Research Gary, the Rockefeller Foundation, and Mobilization for the War on Words," *Journal of Communication* 46, no. 3 (1996). Gary's account is the most comprehensive, and is relied on here with reference, too, to archival materials.

<sup>19</sup> The Seminar's non-Ford participants were Waples; Lazarsfeld; Lasswell; Robert Lynd, the Columbia sociologist; Cantril; Geoffrey Gorer, an Oxford-trained anthropologist; Lyman Bryson, an adult education specialist; Donald Slesinger, former Dean of the Social Sciences at Chicago and director of the Rockefeller-funded American Film Center; I.A. Richards, the prominent Canadian literary theorist; Charles Siepmann, a communication analyst for the BBC; and Lloyd Free, the once and future Cantril collaborator who would, in 1940, take over the editorship of the *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Among the Rockefeller participants was Robert Havighurst, who would soon join Chicago's Education Department alongside Ralph Tyler, where the two men helped re-launch the university's Committee on Human Development.



unprecedented knowledge of the public mind and of the means by which leadership can secure consent.<sup>23</sup>

Novel research methods, the group continued, can “reliably inform us about the public mind and about how it is being, or can be, influenced in relation to public affairs.” Here was the new field’s charge, to deploy science in the service of world-historical struggle—to instruct the country’s leaders in winning over its citizens at an exigent hour. The old “rule of thumb methods” won’t do; the task of securing consent must rest on a “scientific basis of accurately ascertained fact.” Communication research, the report concludes, is a “new and sure weapon to achieve that end.”<sup>24</sup>

For all its martial swagger, the report carefully qualifies the claim that mass media can easily sway opinions. The main message, here and throughout the group’s meetings, is that media persuasion is *hard*—and that figuring out how to make it work is the urgent task of research. The report is, at the same time, a charter for the new field, and for the trained, disciplined specialists who alone understand the complex and fraught process of changing minds. To that end the document charts four key questions that, answered together, promise to yield knowledge—actionable insight—about how to successfully persuade. The report’s authors condensed the questions into an alliterative (and enduring) formula: The job of communication research is to determine “who, and with what intention, said what, to whom, and with what effects.”<sup>25</sup> To get at the last, key question—the question of *effects*—the other three questions need answering too: the study of communicators and their media institutions (the “who”), analysis of their content (the “what”), and measurement of their audiences (“to whom”). For each question, the field and its predecessors had developed suitable, rigorous methods—which the report proceeds to fill out. The main obstacle in the way of easy persuasion, according to the report, is the audience. The varied predispositions of readers and listeners, and their propensity to seek out messages congenial with existing beliefs, made it especially challenging to shift their attitudes.

The 1940 Seminar report is an early distillation of what I call the *challenge-and-urgency framework*. The core idea, reinforced by future wartime service, would be taken up by communication researchers in the early Cold War. Both Chicago Committees on Communication, indeed, were founded on its premise. Changing minds and behaviors, the claim went, is a complicated and vexing affair, one that requires the careful exercise of researcher expertise. The challenge, however, must be faced—given “immediate dangers” and “the race against time,” to quote the report’s rendition of high-noon exigency.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>20</sup> J. Michael Sproule, “Propaganda Studies in American Social Science: The Rise and Fall of the Critical Paradigm,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 73 (1987): 75.

<sup>21</sup> The 67-page memo concludes, as an illustrative example, with a proposal to study opinions on the war in 100 cities, tabulated and classified by population. “Public Opinion and the Emergency,” December 1, 1939, folder 2677, box 224, RG 1.1, RFR, 2, 53, 63–67. Lasswell is not credited as the author, but the memo’s prose-style, omniscient scope, and jargon are unmistakably his.

<sup>22</sup> “Public Opinion and the Emergency,” 53.

<sup>23</sup> “Research in Mass Communication,” July 1940, folder 2677, box 224, RG 1.1, RFR, i, 1.

<sup>24</sup> “Research in Mass Communication,” 1–2. “Communication research,” as the field’s name, is used throughout the report (e.g., 22, 31).

<sup>25</sup> “Research in Mass Communication,” 17–18. This formula became famous after the war, when Lasswell repeated it in a 1948 essay. Lasswell, “The Structure and Function of Communication in Society,” in *The Communication of Ideas*, ed. Lyman Bryson (New York: Institute for Religious and Social Studies, 1948), 37.

<sup>26</sup> “Research in Mass Communication,” 3, 4.

The urgency half of the challenge-and-urgency framework was, of course, furnished by war. The idea that mediated persuasion is hard—the challenge half—had been formulated *before* the Nazi conquest, before the Seminar’s convening, though only by a few months. It was the main conclusion of Lazarsfeld’s work on radio research, which he and his team had just hastily summarized, at Marshall’s insistence, in June 1939. The framing concern was educational broadcasting, not war—cultural uplift, rather than opinion mobilization. Yet the findings were soon retrofitted for the war context. By the time Lazarsfeld published the findings as *Radio and the Printed Page* in early 1940, the claim that media campaigns often fail had been absorbed into the Seminar’s baseline deliberations.<sup>27</sup>

The book, in published form, registered the hard pivot to war. Citing the “events of the last few months,” Lazarsfeld observed that fears of radio demagoguery had “receded into the background,” replaced by the aim to make propaganda work: “how to do it has become the problem of the day.” The “advantages and limitations of using the radio for the communication of ideas,” he concluded, “has thus become especially timely since this manuscript was finished.”<sup>28</sup> The Seminar’s program to chart those advantages and limitations—the “how to do it” problem—was, by then, well underway.

Even as Lazarsfeld’s radio research shop was summarizing its results in the early months of 1939, Waples was at work on a similar project, focused on the effects of print. Marshall, here again, was the instigator: In early 1939, months before the Seminar first met, he commissioned Waples to compile a summative report on the effects of reading. The question of effects had been peripheral to Waples’s decade-long reading studies. Marshall, the medievalist-turned-research-impresario, single-handedly re-oriented Waples’s research program.<sup>29</sup> Marshall himself was, at the time, still preoccupied with the problem of cultural uplift. His sponsorship of Waples was, in other words, intended to supplement the portfolio of projects he had already underwritten, with the aim to stimulate popular interest in educational broadcasting and, now, serious reading.<sup>30</sup> Waples’s commissioned project was, like Lazarsfeld’s, re-purposed at the outbreak of European war.

Waples enlisted Berelson, his star student, in the project, which was published in late 1940 as *What Reading Does to People*, with the Seminar’s emergency framing on vivid display.<sup>31</sup> The volume, indeed, is a high-fidelity rendition of the new challenge-and-urgency framework. The book’s synthesis of findings, Waples wrote in the foreword, is intended to serve “a more intelligent direction of communications in the public interest.” Waples and Berelson’s driving question was how to aid the war effort—how to harness, in particu-

<sup>27</sup> Lazarsfeld, *Radio and the Printed Page* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1940.)

<sup>28</sup> Lazarsfeld, *Radio and the Printed Page*, xvii–xviii.

<sup>29</sup> Marshall, Diary 3 January - 26 June 1939, February 14 & 17, 1939, pp. 57, 62, RFR.

<sup>30</sup> On Marshall’s pre-war cultural-uplift orientation, see Marshall, “Next Jobs in Radio and Film,” September 13, 1938, folder 50, box 5, series 911, RG 3, RFR.

<sup>31</sup> Waples, Berelson, and Franklyn R. Bradshaw, *What Reading Does to People* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940). Bradshaw was another doctoral student at the Graduate Library School.

lar, printed materials to win popular consent to rational state leadership. Modern warfare requires the full mobilization of a country's propaganda capacity. Its campaigns, they added, must be supported "by all the pressures which the arts of public communication can bring to bear." The backdrop of war—and the authors' barely concealed expectations for U.S. entry—"justify the publication at this time" of their "brief treatise on the social effects of reading."<sup>32</sup>

The book is organized according to the Seminar's who-says-what-to-whom-with-what-effect formula, with a chapter devoted to each of the four questions. The chapter on readers is entirely focused on their "predispositions"—how these condition the "reader's selection of publication" and "his interpretation of what he reads." In line with Lazarsfeld's approach, and the Seminar's echo of the theme, Waples and Berelson stressed the difficulty posed by readers' predispositional baggage. Like Lazarsfeld, they described reinforcement of existing beliefs as the most consistent effect, with conversion a rarer occurrence.<sup>33</sup> The book concludes with a lengthy "Next Steps" appendix, centered on four "obstructions" to persuasion-by-reading—obstructions which, Waples and Berelson propose, might be overcome with careful study, in the service of "a more intelligent social control of print in the public interest."<sup>34</sup>

The book, in short, applies the Seminar's challenge-and-urgency framework to print, in what was—from the Seminar's standpoint—a medium-by-medium division of labor. What Lazarsfeld was studying for radio, Waples (and Berelson) had taken up for print. The July 1940 Seminar report credits the two teams' contributions in just these terms, and positions their research operations as the model for a proposed, national-scale "institute of research on communication." The report adds, by way of reinforcing the point, that the two teams, Lazarsfeld's and Waples's, had long collaborated.<sup>35</sup>

The report's nod to collaboration was somewhat misleading: Lazarsfeld and Waples had only recently partnered on a project. The ubiquitous Marshall had engineered (and funded) the partnership, bringing Waples on board to help with Lazarsfeld's in-progress 1940 election study—the project which, in 1944, would get published as *The People's Choice*. Waples, in turn, enlisted Berelson in the study of print effects, carried out in the same small Ohio city, Sandusky, that hosted the larger project. Lasswell was involved too: He arranged for his graduate student, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and his former research assistant, Nathan Leites, to help Waples and Berelson with the fieldwork. The report that Waples and Berelson produced—which appeared as a chapter in *The People's Choice*—became, in revised form, Berelson's 1941 dissertation.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Waples, Berelson, and Bradshaw, *What Reading Does to People*, v, 4.

<sup>33</sup> Waples, Berelson, and Bradshaw, *What Reading Does to People*, chap. 5, 113, 119, 121

<sup>34</sup> Waples, Berelson, and Bradshaw, *What Reading Does to People*, 181.

<sup>35</sup> The report, in its penultimate paragraph, calls for "complete integration through an institute of research in communication," citing the example of economics. "One such organization now exists for radio in the Columbia Office of Radio Research, which has already demonstrated its ability to plan and carry through special projects of research at relatively small expense along with its major program. Much the same is true of the Graduate Library School of the University of Chicago, which for some years has been a center for research in reader." "Research in Mass Communication," 37.

It is a remarkable fact that the Lazarsfeld-directed election study was hatched and carried out as part of the Seminar's war-communications program. In the Seminar's July report, the study's early findings are framed as breaking-news insight into the hard task of persuasion. Lazarsfeld's team, the report states, has learned that "opinion in a community tends to be channeled through key opinion leaders," who, in turn, read "more serious national magazines and metropolitan newspapers." Such opinion leaders, moreover, have influence within their own social group and "in the town as a whole." This is, in unpublished form, the two-step flow of communication model—the soon-famous idea, elaborated in *The People's Choice's* last chapter, that media messages flow first to opinion leaders, who then spread the news to their social circles. There and in subsequent Lazarsfeld publications, most notably *Personal Influence* (1955), the two-step flow construal was presented as proof that media influence is happily negligible—a *Geimeinschaft*-after-all conclusion positioned against public-intellectual fretting. Here, in 1940, the two-step thesis is suggested as a promising blueprint for making propaganda work.<sup>37</sup>

Waples himself made the same claim in a late 1940 meeting with Marshall. He told Marshall that the print study he and Berelson had carried out for the Sandusky project had confirmed Lazarsfeld's main radio findings. Only a "relatively small group in the upper economic and educational strata," he told Marshall, were influenced by print materials. This was, however, a "key group," since these upper-strata readers "draw on what they read to become opinion leaders through conversation." The implication was obvious: Target these opinion leaders who, in turn, will spread messages to their circles.<sup>38</sup>

After pushback from a minority of Seminar members and other Rockefeller officials, who objected to the July report's anti-democratic implications, the group issued a toned-down final report in fall 1940, one that stressed "two-way communication" between the populace and its government.<sup>39</sup> Still, Marshall moved to implement the July report's main recommendations, announcing to his Rockefeller colleagues that the foundation's projects would engage the "three-fold task of maintaining civilian morale at home, of maintaining good relations with friendly countries, and of waging propaganda warfare with countries hostile to us."<sup>40</sup> From fall 1940 until the U.S. entry into the war in December 1941, the foundation served, in essence, as an unofficial arm of the state, when the Roosevelt administration—hampered by a public culture still wary of propaganda, and a somewhat isolationist Congress—could not feasibly do so itself.<sup>41</sup> By late 1940, the foundation had set up and funded an elaborate bundle of propaganda-related projects, including Cantril's Princeton Public

<sup>36</sup> The Waples/Berelson report was titled "Public Communications and Public Opinion," though only an lengthy abstract could be located: Waples and Berelson, "Studies of Public Communications and Public Opinion with Reference to National Defense," n.d. [1941], folder 13, box 58, Office of the Vice-President 1937–1946, Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library (OVP hereafter); Berelson, "The Effects of Print on Public Opinion," PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1941. *The People's Choice* chapter was the thirteenth, which credits Waples and Berelson, and also acknowledges Leites and Pool. 168n1. Leites was also credited for major help in the 1940 *What Reading Does to People*. An early footnote: "This is as appropriate a place as any to acknowledge our deep obligation to Dr. Natan [sic] C. Leites, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, for indispensable criticism and practical advice." 6

<sup>37</sup> Elihu Katz, and Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1955). For a treatment of the two-decade audience-dependent re-packaging of the two-step idea—swimming from effective propaganda to minimal effects—see Pooley, "Fifteen Pages That Shook the Field: *Personal Influence*, Edward Shils, and the Remembered History of Mass Communication Research," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 608, no. 1 (2006).

<sup>38</sup> Marshall, Diary 8 July - 31 June 1940, December 17, 1940, p. 164, RFR.

<sup>39</sup> "Needed Research in Communication," October 1940, folder 2677, box 224, RG 1.1, RFR.

<sup>40</sup> Marshall to Stevens, "Communication Research Projects which should be considered before the end of 1940," September 13, 1940, folder 2674, box 224, RFR.

Opinion Research Project; the Princeton Shortwave Listening Center; the Film Library of the Museum of Modern Art (which included Siegfried Kracauer's studies of Nazi film propaganda); the Totalitarian Communications Project at the New School (under Ernst Kris and Hans Speier); and Lasswell's content analysis operation, the Experimental Division for the Study of Wartime Communications at the Library of Congress.

The first Chicago Committee on Communication was the byproduct of Waples's attempt to join this effort—to establish a Rockefeller-funded research station at Chicago. When the foundation demurred, he turned to the university's committee system instead.

### 3. *The First Committee*

In the spring of 1941, Waples began drawing up plans for what he called the "Chicago Communications Station." By June he was circulating a two-page proposal to university and Rockefeller officials. The core idea was to use Chicago as a site to measure the effects of war-related propaganda, with the plan to issue "periodic, semi-confidential reports" to federal officials. Waples proposed to study both pro-Nazi messages and official U.S. campaigns to, for example, promote the sale of war bonds. Echoing the Seminar's key takeaway, Waples stressed that many campaigns are ignored, or even backfire; thus looking at the materials alone can lead to "serious mistakes." His Station would analyze these materials and, at the same time, survey local citizens, with the goal to combine the two data types to draw conclusions about the messages' effects. "To make his own public relations effective," Waples wrote, "and also to spot subversive propaganda as such, the policy-maker must know what people are being told about the particular issue at the given time *and* how they are responding to what they are told." The Station would be directed out of the university, which has, he noted, the trained personnel and equipment to carry out the monitoring.<sup>42</sup>

Waples was keen to stress that his proposed center would have a double mission, to serve the war-effort *and* science: "the much needed extension of scientific knowledge about social aspect of public communications; and the providing of practical advice as needed." As evidence that the proposed research scheme could produce the promised results, he enclosed the Sandusky report that he and Berelson had recently completed for Lazarsfeld.<sup>43</sup>

Waples took the idea to Marshall, pressing hard for Rockefeller funding. Citing support from informal canvassing of the proposal in Washington, Waples suggested sending his proposal to "20 or 30 key government officials." Marshall declined to commit to funding

<sup>41</sup> An extraordinary example of this proxy role, only mentioned here due to space constraints, is a private, early 1941 "Conference on Communication Research" that Marshall organized with Lasswell and Cantril. The purpose was to "bring specialist in communication research into touch" with government officials; Lasswell, Cantril, Waples, Lazarsfeld, among a handful of other social scientists, were joined by seven government officials, representing agencies ranging from the Navy, the Library of Congress, the FCC, the Departments of Justice and the Interior. Marshall, in his diary, records the officials' enthusiastic reception of the knowledge shared. "The immediate need," he wrote, "is to find some way of making available to government agencies findings arrived at by agencies outside the government." After Marshall suggested that private and government efforts should not duplicate one another, one of the officials replied that there was "little likelihood" of "the government's duplicating any work now in progress." Marshall, Diary 6 January - 30 June 1941, January 18, 1941, pp. 33-35, RFR.

<sup>42</sup> Waples, "A Statement concerning the Proposed Chicago Communications Station," June 1, 1941, folder 23, box 19, OVP, 1-2. Waples had finalized his proposal after a visit to Washington, where he (to quote Marshall's summary) drew on the "advice of some of his friends in the government." Marshall, Diary 6 January - 30 June 1941, June 9, 1941, p. 263, RFR.

<sup>43</sup> Waples, "A Statement concerning the Proposed," 2.

Waples's center, suggesting that government underwriting would be more appropriate.<sup>44</sup> At the time, Marshall was taking steps to delicately transfer some of the Rockefeller-sponsored projects to the federal government. Earlier in the year, President Roosevelt had used his emergency funds to establish the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service (FBMS), which immediately absorbed the Rockefeller-funded Princeton Shortwave Listening Center and its staff.<sup>45</sup>

Both Berelson and Waples were pulled into the nascent government-sponsored initiatives that summer of 1941. Waples had introduced Berelson to Marshall earlier in the year, pressing for a fellowship for his talented student.<sup>46</sup> After his dissertation defense, Berelson was awarded the fellowship, and was briefly seconded to the New School project run by Ernst Kris and Hans Speier. A month later he was recruited to the FBMS, working to interpret German short-wave radio.<sup>47</sup>

Waples, for his part, had picked up commissioned work from Lasswell's Library of Congress operation, completing an "intensive study of the French press during the collapse of France."<sup>48</sup> Over this same 1941 summer, Leites and Pool joined Lasswell's content analysis shop as full-time staff. They were all—Lasswell, Leites, Pool, Berelson, even Waples—among the earliest members of the federal propaganda and morale bureaucracy that would, a half year later, bring hundreds of social scientists to Washington.

Waples remained in Chicago, however, and continued to sell his proposal for a Communications Station. With little prospect of Rockefeller support, he turned to the university itself. In August, he organized a week-long conference in August at the Graduate Library School, on the "implications of print, radio and film for democratic government." The gathering featured papers by a number of Communications Seminar participants, including Lazarsfeld, Lasswell, and Donald Slesinger, director of the Rockefeller-funded American Film Center (and former Dean of the Social Sciences Division). The event was framed in familiar terms: "During periods of national crisis," the official program stated, "the decisions by governmental authorities upon controversial issues may cause government and public opinion to drift apart." The conference aimed to enlist "those now engaged in communications research" to help "clarify the problems by public discussion."<sup>49</sup> Waples's framing remarks, and his conference summary published in the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, make clear that he was, among other things, making the local case for his as-yet unrealized Chicago Communications Station.<sup>50</sup>

There were, notably, a number of speakers from the university's social science departments, among them political scientist Harold Gosnell, sociologist Samuel Stouffer, and Waples's former collaborator

<sup>44</sup> Marshall, Diary 6 January - 30 June 1941, June 9, 1941, pp. 263-64, RFR.

<sup>45</sup> Daniel Bessner, *Democracy in Exile: Hans Speier and the Rise of the Defense Intellectual* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018), 93.

<sup>46</sup> Marshall, Diary 6 January - 30 June 1941, January 15, 1941, p. 30, RFR.

<sup>47</sup> Rockefeller and the nascent federal initiatives were tightly knitted in what was, by any measure, a small, elite world. The director of the new FBMS, to take another, was the young political scientist Lloyd Free, who had served as the Seminar's secretary while also the *Public Opinion Quarterly's* management editor—taking up both roles after serving as Lazarsfeld's assistant director at the Office of Radio Research. He would leave, in 1942, to join Cantril, who was working with Nelson Rockefeller's agency for the balance of the war. Cantril was Nelson Rockefeller's roommate at Dartmouth. On Berelson's brief stint at the Kris and Speier New School Project, see Ernst Kris and Hans Speier, "Statement," December 30, 1941, RFR. On Berelson's joining the FBMS, see Isabel S. Grossner, Oral History Interview of Bernard Berelson, Columbia University Oral History Research Office, 1967, 7-8. Note that the FBMS was renamed Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS) mid-war; I have retained the original name throughout the chapter.

<sup>48</sup> Marshall, Diary 1 July - 31 December 1941, August 8, 1941, p. 47, RFR.

<sup>49</sup> "An Institute on the Implications of Print, Radio and Film for Democratic Government," August 4-9, 1941, folder 5, box 480, University of Chicago Press Records, 1892-1965, Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library (UCP hereafter), 2.

<sup>50</sup> Douglas Waples, "Press, Radio and Film in the National Emergency," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 5, no. 3 (1941).

rator, education scholar Ralph Tyler. Waples also recruited Chicago faculty to serve as “chairmen” of each day’s meeting. The chairmen included Leites, education scholar Daniel Prescott, anthropologist Lloyd Warner, and Robert Havighurst, the chemist-turned-education scholar who had, as a Rockefeller official, participated in the Seminar. Prescott, Havighurst, Warner and Tyler were, at the time, building out the recently re-launched Committee on Human Development.<sup>51</sup> Chicago sociologists Louis Wirth and Herbert Blumer also served as chairmen.

Of the fourteen papers, those by Lazarsfeld, Lasswell, Slesinger, and the New School’s Ernst Kris closely hewed to Waples’s “National Emergency” framing. The purpose of the gathering, Waples said, was to “bring together a group of men actively engaged in communications research” to “make their knowledge useful to the policy-makers in wartime.”<sup>52</sup> Lazarsfeld, in his remarks, shared evidence on the in-progress Sandusky study, identifying “so-called opinion leaders,” who “listened to the radio and read the newspapers, and then through various forms of personal contact conveyed what they learned to the large masses of the population.” The suggestion, here again, is that personal influence paired with media messages might, through the opinion leader’s “role of go-between,” make for effective persuasion.<sup>53</sup>

In what was a debut of sorts, Berelson delivered a paper based on his dissertation, defended in June. Drawing on his and Waples’s Sandusky fieldwork, he stressed the challenge posed by reader predispositions, one that makes conversion a hard but surmountable problem. In a democracy, he concluded, a “knowing élite should communicate in frankness and truth to the masses.” The many “must benefit by the knowledge accumulated by the few.” His last line drove the point home: “I will not be thought disrespectful if I say, in all humility, that never have so many had so much to gain from so few.”<sup>54</sup>

Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and even Waples took some pains to qualify their support for domestic propaganda with reference to the free and open debate that a democracy demands. Lasswell was far less circumspect—and less modest, too, about the short-run promise of communications research. His Library of Congress content-analysis shop was already up and running, and with it the “symbol patterns of world-politics” mode of distant reading he had proposed in the mid-1930s—“appropriate,” he said here, “to the task of seeing the world as others see it.”<sup>55</sup> On the domestic front, he called for state control of public opinion polling, together with government-coordinated education campaigns, in the service of “achieving public opinion adjusted to political reality.” If we are “genuinely concerned with the survival of democratic society,” he concluded, “we will try

<sup>51</sup> The Committee on Human Development was created in 1940, by renaming and re-conceiving the university’s Committee on Child Development, which was founded in 1930.

<sup>52</sup> Waples, “Press, Radio and Film,” v, viii, ix–x.

<sup>53</sup> Lazarsfeld, “The Effects of Radio on Public Opinion,” in *Print, Radio and Film in a Democracy*, ed. Douglas Waples (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), 73–74.

<sup>54</sup> Berelson, “The Effects of Print upon Public Opinion,” in *Print, Radio and Film in a Democracy*, ed. Waples (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), 63, 65.

<sup>55</sup> Lasswell, “Communications Research and Politics,” in *Print, Radio and Film in a Democracy*, ed. Waples (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), 105.

to work out ways and means of improving the realistic quality of the public will."<sup>56</sup>

Waples would not go that far, at least not in public. He had a more local aim in mind: the establishment of an institute designed for policy advice:

The solution is doubtless to be sought in some representative, fluid, and unofficial group of specialists in communications research—a group operating mid-way between the laboratory and the executive desk. The group would select evidence pertinent to typical and persistent problems of communications policy—evidence which the administrator may use or disregard as he sees fit.<sup>57</sup>

The purpose of such an institute would be to ensure the "government's intelligent use of print, radio, and film in the interest of national defense and all-out prosecution of the war."<sup>58</sup> This was, of course, the blueprint for his Communications Station too.

Rockefeller's Marshall attended the August gathering's last day. At the event, Waples told him that he understood the foundation's decision not to fund the Communications Station. He "now agreed," he said, that support for such work should come from "government sources."<sup>59</sup> Waples had concluded that his university-based center could be bankrolled by the government, perhaps through Lasswell's research operation.<sup>60</sup> He rushed the August conference papers into print, on the hope that the published proceedings would boost his proposal's local prospects.<sup>61</sup> He made little headway, despite circulating revised versions of his proposal to administrators in the fall. It was only Pearl Harbor, and the official U.S. entry to war, that changed his project's fortunes.

Hutchins was the pivotal figure. Waples, by design or by accident, had encountered the university's president at a Trustees' party in early 1942. Hutchins, hearing Waples out, agreed to talk further about what Waples, in a follow up letter, characterized as "the University's relation to the federal agencies concerned with communications and public opinion." A week later Waples wrote with a fresh proposal, involving—as Waples wrote in his cover letter to Hutchins—"both war-gadgets and more intellectual products."<sup>62</sup>

What he enclosed for Hutchins was a reworked plan, now focused on training communications specialists who, Waples argued, would soon be in heavy government demand. The three-page brief, for an "Institute for Training and Research in the Field of Public Communications and Public Opinion at the University of Chicago," was carefully calibrated to the new live-war conditions. As a rationale for a training program for "service on the propaganda front," Waples noted that most communications researchers had already left their host universities for Washington. The federal agencies, his pitch con-

<sup>56</sup> Lasswell, "Communications Research and Politics," 114. The same muscular argument for steering domestic public opinion was made at greater length in a just-published book, *Democracy Through Public Opinion* (New York: George Banta, 1941), which a number of conference participants cited approvingly. The argument is an update, for war conditions, of Lasswell's long-running, unabashed endorsement of elite-driven propaganda to guide "the civilian mind" even in formally democratic states like the U.S., all the way back to his 1927 dissertation.

<sup>57</sup> Waples, "Introduction," in *Print, Radio and Film in a Democracy*, ed. Waples (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), vi.

<sup>58</sup> Waples, "Introduction," vi–vii.

<sup>59</sup> Marshall, Diary 1 July - 31 December 1941, August 8, 1941, p. 47, RFR.

<sup>60</sup> He continued to circulate revised versions of the June proposal to senior administrators in the fall. He was, at the same time, attempting to set up a network of "University Observation Posts" on his Chicago model, at least according to a trio of late-1941 memos on the idea. No other materials related to the broader network could be located in the archives nor the secondary literature, so it appears that Waples's wider scheme failed to take off. "Suggested Agenda for University Observation Posts," n.d., folder 14, box 58, OVP; "To Local Collaborators," November 1941, folder 14, box 58, OVP; and several others.

<sup>61</sup> On the 1941 publication plans, see Waples, "Press, Radio and Film," 469. The University of Chicago Press published the book in February 1942. Date-stamped cover, folder 5, box 480, UCP.

<sup>62</sup> Waples to Hutchins, January 14, 1942, folder Communications and Public Opinion, Committee on, 1942–1945, box 57, Office of the President, Hutchins Administration, Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library (OOP hereafter).



tinued, will inevitably need many more trained personnel, with—he added pointedly—government funds likely to follow.<sup>63</sup>

The “Institute” proposal cited a second rationale: It would, Waples claimed, yield intellectual rewards after the war. The “so-called ‘field’ of communication research,” he wrote, “is, of course, not a field by any academic definition. It has no boundaries.” Still, he said, the field’s current status among “influential institutions, industries, professional groups, and government agencies” are “fairly certain to give it a respectable status in the post-war university.” Waples footnoted the claim to his conference book, which, he wrote, would be published within days. If Chicago does not jump into the field, he continued, “almost certainly Harvard or Columbia will.” And Chicago has an advantage over its rivals: If the Rockefeller Foundation “survives the war,” it will “be friendly to Chicago in this connection.” Waples closed the proposal with a recommendation to appoint a small faculty committee to draw up a program, to be circulated to government officials and Chicago faculty for feedback. He included a list of 30 Chicago social scientists with relevant expertise.<sup>64</sup>

With Hutchins on board, the university moved quickly to establish Waples’s center.<sup>65</sup> By February, the decision had been made to use Chicago’s unique committee structure, rather than Waples’s proposed “institute” model. There is no record of deliberation about the choice; proposal drafts suddenly adopted the “Committee on” nomenclature, and the project was soon established in the committee mold.

It appears that Hutchins, while he supported the Committee’s creation, had little trust in Waples himself. From the beginning, the president was casting about for other candidates to lead the new program.<sup>66</sup> Waples’s proposal went through several drafts, and it was probably Hutchins who recruited the fiercely precocious sociologist Edward Shils to help Waples get the document in shape.<sup>67</sup> In a flurry of revisions, the committee’s name was sometimes rendered as “War Time Communications and Public Opinion”; by the end of February, the “Communication and Public Opinion” had won stable purchase.

Whatever Shils’ influence, the plan was signed by, and indebted to, Waples’s year-long run of proposals. The document outlined the same dual purpose, blending urgent service to government with fundamental work on the science of communications. Waples’s preoccupation with pairing content analysis and opinion research, in the service of measuring effects, was repeated here too. Student training and the committee’s research agenda were, according to the plan, meant to go hand in hand, with students conducting fieldwork under faculty supervision. It is telling that Waples closed the document with the note that faculty members’ “full and part-time services will

<sup>63</sup> It was a delicate argument to make, since Waples also included a long list of “available personnel” at Chicago, many of whom (like Leites, Pool, and Stouffer) had already decamped to Washington. Thus, for example, Waples mentioned Stouffer twice—first as a government official (at the “Army’s Morale Branch”) to be consulted, and, second, as a Chicago figure who could contribute to the program. Waples, “An Institute for Training and Research in the Field of Public Communications and Public Opinion at the University of Chicago,” n.d. [1942], folder Communications and Public Opinion, Committee on, 1942–1945, box 57, OOP.

<sup>64</sup> Waples, “An Institute for Training.”

<sup>65</sup> Hutchins shared the proposal with William Benton, the advertising executive that Hutchins had recruited to burnish the university’s image, who was also supportive. “I am very much interested in your memorandum,” Hutchins wrote to Waples in reply. “I made the mistake of showing it to Mr. Benton. Mr Benton became excited about it, gave a copy to Mr. Frodin, and took the original to Washington. As soon as he comes back I should like to talk to you about it.” Hutchins to Waples, January 17, 1942, folder Communications and Public Opinion, Committee on, 1942–1945, box 57, OOP. Reuben Frodin was an assistant to Hutchins.

<sup>66</sup> A late January memo from Hutchins’ administrative assistant noted that Hutchins wanted the institute established outside the Library School. Summarizing Hutchins’ view, he added, “Only two men mentioned in [Waples’] memorandum would be suitable heads of the institute,” citing Benton, the former advertising agency head, and Stephen Corey, an education scholar. Cutler to William Benton, January 24, 1942, folder 23, box 19, OVP.

need to be secured" before the program's announcement. There is no evidence that any such allotment was made.<sup>68</sup>

Hutchins appointed two senior faculty to vet the plan with Waples: Robert Redfield, the anthropologist and Dean of the Social Sciences Division, and Richard McKeon, the philosopher and Dean of the Humanities Division. Neither was particularly familiar with the new science of persuasion; thus Hutchins' motive, it seems, was to introduce adult supervision. Despite his doubts about Waples, Hutchins wanted the Committee established, and quickly—to be up and running before the spring quarter. By the end of February, Redfield, McKeon, and Waples circulated a new precis for official approval. The document led with a list of additional Committee members: Blumer, Arthur Kornhauser (a psychologist in the Business School), sociologist William Ogburn, Tyler, Warner, Wirth, and political scientist Quincy Wright.<sup>69</sup>

The document, like those before, positioned training and research as the new committee's dual mission. The program will train students—with degrees conferred in their home departments—to take up service in those federal agencies "undertaking to unite public opinion in full support of the war, to develop an intelligent national morale, and to prepare the nation for a rational approach to post-war problems." Fundamental studies were called out too, though the stress was on real-time summary and integration—an "immediate duty in the field of communications research." Citing the plural but siloed contributions to the field, the precis placed special emphasis on the pressing need for cross-departmental collaboration.<sup>70</sup>

Despite the Committee's broad representation across the social sciences, Waples was the only member with any substantial background in the new field. His leading role was evident in the Committee's program of study, which was proposed here along the lines of the Communications Seminar's who-says-what-to-whom-with-what-effects formula.<sup>71</sup> Existing Chicago courses were slotted under five categories, followed in each case by a handful of new courses (such as *Public Control of Media of Communication* and *Methods of Content Analysis*). The idea was that the Committee's students, enrolled in another social science master's program, would devote a year of study to the Committee's cross-listed offerings.

In his cover letter for the jointly authored precis, Waples pushed for quick approval, dangling the potential loss of Shils. "Our competitive position with other universities," he wrote, "is likely to be weakened by the loss of irreplaceable men any day until we have an executive committee authorized to negotiate with them, e.g. Shils."<sup>72</sup> Waples, it would appear, was banking on the prospect of dedicated faculty appointments—his own among them, one suspects. But

<sup>67</sup> Drafts from early February bear a footnote off their title: "Of the several people who helped with this statement, Mr. E. A. Shils deserves particular thanks." "Committee on War Time Communications and Public Opinion," n.d. [1942], folder 23, box 19, OVP, 1. Shils was, at the time, in Hutchins' orbit, leading the creation of the undergraduate college social science curriculum and playing a large role in the Committee on Social Thought, too.

<sup>68</sup> "Committee on Public Communications and Public Opinion," n.d. [1942], folder 23, box 19, OVP, 5.

<sup>69</sup> Waples to Emery Filbey, February 18, 1942, folder Communications and Public Opinion, Committee on, 1942-1945, box 57, OOP. The precis was attached.

<sup>70</sup> Waples to Emery Filbey, February 18, 1942.

<sup>71</sup> There were plans for an Advisory Council, apparently never realized, which was to consist of outside experts, most of them former Communications Seminar participants and/or active in the public opinion research community—Cantril, Lasswell, Lazarsfeld, Slesinger, Bryson, Lynd, Leo Rosten, Frank Stanton, and Ralph Casey.

<sup>72</sup> Waples to Emery Filbey, February 18, 1942.

the Committee, unlike many of its peers, featured no faculty cross-appointments, nor were any staff appointed to manage its affairs.

In what must have been an additional disappointment, Hutchins appointed Redfield as the Committee's chair, with Waples as secretary. Even so, Waples was plainly in charge—convening meetings, organizing seminars, and finalizing catalog copy, often with a “for Robert Redfield” under his signature. Evidence of Waples's tireless, sometimes exasperating hustle is all over the archival materials.

The program was launched for the spring quarter, with the official title “Committee on Study in Communications and Public Opinion.” The catalog listed over 60 courses slated for the spring and the following year, nearly all of them existing offerings in the mainline disciplines. Just five of the ten new courses proposed in the precis made the catalog; two of those (*Wartime Communications* and *Methods of Content Analysis*) were Waples's, and he taught both that spring.<sup>73</sup>

It was Waples, too, who organized the weekly Seminar on Communications and Public Opinion, which was open to the Committee's faculty and students. It was, perhaps, another indignity that at the first gathering, Redfield appointed McKeon to lead a “Program” subcommittee, with Wirth designated as the “Research” subcommittee chair.<sup>74</sup> There was, apparently, an open call for research proposals under the new Committee's auspices, for review by the university's Rockefeller-funded grant-making body, the Social Science Research Committee (SSRC). The SSRC (not to be confused with the national organization) was itself chaired by Redfield, with sociologist Wirth—Redfield's assistant dean at the time—serving as secretary. Thus those holding the purse-strings were, at the very same time, the Committee's chair and “Research” chair, respectively.

It is curious indeed that Redfield and Wirth declined to fund any of the nine proposals submitted by faculty. Wirth, acting as subcommittee chair, delivered an early May memo to the SSRC, where he was, as noted, serving as secretary. Wirth stated that the full Communication committee, as well as the Research subcommittee he chaired, had discussed the proposals. Both groups are “too heterogenous and large,” however, to examine the projects' merits, he said. The proposals themselves, he continued, “reveal no striking innovation in method,” nor have they been “formulated as part of a general program.” Wirth's solution—proposed to himself, in effect—was that his and Redfield's SSRC should appoint its *own* subcommittee.<sup>75</sup> The next day, that's exactly what they did: The SSRC funding committee, which also included Tyler and three others, voted to appoint Wirth and Tyler to a “Sub-Committee on Communication Research.” The group's charge was to confer with government agencies to “develop, if possible, one single research project on war communication.”<sup>76</sup>

<sup>73</sup> The other new classes were political scientist Herman Pritchett's *Public Control of the Media of Communication* and two from McKeon: *Survey of Rhetorics* and *Semantics of Political Terms*. None was offered in the first spring. University of Chicago, “Study in Communications and Public Opinion,” Spring, Summer, Autumn 1942, Winter, Spring 1943, folder Communications and Public Opinion, Committee on, 1942-1945, box 57, OOP.

<sup>74</sup> Waples to William Benton, April 11, 1942, folder 23, box 19, OVP.

<sup>75</sup> Louis Wirth, memo to Social Science Research Committee, May 4, 1942, folder 7, box 32, Ralph W. Tyler Papers, Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library [RWT hereafter], 2

<sup>76</sup> Social Science Research Committee minutes, May 5, 1942, folder 7, box 32, RWT.

The next week, the funding group voted to allocate \$2,000 for such a project, a sum that “might be augmented in case a promising long-range program could be delivered.” Tyler and Wirth were granted authority to disburse the funds, under their SSRC roles.<sup>77</sup>

The archival record offers no clear explanation for what was, in effect, an internal coup. The nine submitted proposals, taken as a whole, had a fragmentary character at obvious odds with the Committee’s founding vision for coordinated, cross-department projects. Still, it is quite plausible that the maneuver by Redfield, Wirth, and Tyler was an attempt to sideline Waples, who had continued to push the core Communications Station idea. To that effect, Waples had distributed a detailed memo in advance of the Research subcommittee’s first meeting in early April, signed “Douglas Waples for Louis Wirth CHAIRMAN.”<sup>78</sup> Without clarifying evidence, however, the motive behind the Redfield, Wirth, and Tyler move remains conjecture.

It is unclear, moreover, if the SSRC ever disbursed the limited funds it had allotted. The published record suggests that not much was spent: Only a single article was published acknowledging the Committee’s support, according to a thorough search.<sup>79</sup> And the Committee itself did not survive the year. Though there was no official closure announcement, the university’s 1943–1944 catalog makes no mention of it. The Committee had closed before it truly began.<sup>80</sup>

Waples’s role in the decision to shutter the Committee is unclear. He left before the fall quarter, moving to Washington to join the Office of War Information.<sup>81</sup> The closure was ironic confirmation of the Committee’s original rationale: The social science exodus to Washington meant that no one was left on campus to train the propaganda specialists. For most of the hundreds of social scientists drafted into the swelling propaganda and morale bureaucracy, that training happened on the job.

#### 4. *The Second Committee*

In 1946, Berelson was lured back to Chicago with the offer of the Library School’s deanship. He was, by then, tightly identified with communications research, and set out to resurrect Waples’s stillborn committee in his teacher’s absence. There was, he discovered, lingering interest in the administration, which Waples had helped to fan from his federal-agency perch.<sup>82</sup> Berelson soon assembled a group of social science colleagues, who set about to draft a proposal. By 1948 the Committee on Communication was reborn. In most respects, the revived Committee resembled its World War II predecessor. The field’s basic orientation to the study of short-run persuasion campaigns supplied the foundation for the new Committee.

<sup>77</sup> Social Science Research Committee minutes, May 12, 1942, folder 7, box 32, RWT.

<sup>78</sup> Waples, “Committee on Local Studies,” April 1942, folder 23, box 19, OVP.

<sup>79</sup> The article, by psychologist and Committee member Arthur Kornhauser, reported on war attitudes in Chicago, “supported by grants to the University Committee on Communication and Public Opinion by the Social Science Research Committee.” Kornhauser, “Chicago Surveys Concerning the Public’s Beliefs and Desires about the War,” *The Journal of Social Psychology* 18, no. 2 (1943): 371.

<sup>80</sup> Waples, in a 1944 letter to Hutchins proposing a revival, referred to the first Committee “we had started when the war broke it up.” Waples to Hutchins, September 29, 1944, folder Communications and Public Opinion, Committee on, 1942–1945, box 57, OOP.

<sup>81</sup> Waples, *On the March: A Short Autobiography for Friends Family* (privately printed, 1967), 5–6. Waples, interestingly, makes no mention of the first Committee in his memoir. Thanks to Gary Jaworski for providing a digital copy of the memoir.

Soon the Cold War further justified the continuity between the first and second Committees. In the one-year interval between the second Committee's approval and its formal beginnings, Czechoslovakia succumbed to a Soviet-engineered coup, the Berlin Blockade began, NATO was formed, the Soviets got the atom bomb, and China "fell." The world-historical stakes, so formative to the first Committee, gave the second some of its shape too. The challenge-and-urgency framework—figuring out the hard task of making propaganda work—was on the agenda again.

Most of the Committee's faculty members were veterans of the World War II propaganda directorate; indeed, at one time or another, most had served alongside one another at one or more agencies. By the late 1940s, just as the Committee got underway, many of them were again working on government and foundation-sponsored Cold War initiatives. The postwar interregnum had been brief indeed.<sup>83</sup>

Berelson's 1946 return to Chicago was apparently predicated on the revival of the communication program. A month into his tenure, Berelson was already seeking funds to support his research agenda in communications research. In a proposal to the university's SSRC, he outlined three major projects. The first was a history of mass exposure to communications, centered on reading. Berelson's second project was a "basic book on communication research," intended to inventory the field's decade-long accumulation of findings, that he proposed to author with Lazarsfeld. The in-progress book, he noted, will "cover the four major areas of communication research: [...] *who* does *what* to *whom*, and with *what* effect." The book, he added, will be "particularly useful to us here as one guide to the development of a broad integrated program of communication research underway at this University." Berelson's third project was also in service of a future program: He proposed to use the recently established Chicago Community Inventory, under Louis Wirth's leadership, as "an excellent operating agency for field research in communication."<sup>84</sup>

Under Berelson's leadership, a Faculty Committee on Communication was already meeting in the fall.<sup>85</sup> An early 1947 report faithfully reprised the field's consensus, consolidated in war service. The conversion effects of mass media are weakened by audiences' predispositions and ties to primary groups, the report stated. The main media effects, instead, are reinforcement, followed by activation of "latent opinions," and only rarely out-and-out opinion change. The media, nevertheless, "exert a substantial indirect influence" through opinion leaders, who "transmit media content to the non-readers and non-listeners." Overall, the report concluded in an early statement of the field's emerging embrace of low-grade functionalism, media tend

<sup>82</sup> Waples, in 1944, had written to Hutchins floating the idea of restarting the Committee. Hutchins was apparently interested, encouraging Waples to elaborate on his plans. Waples to Hutchins, September 29, 1944, folder Communications and Public Opinion, Committee on, 1942-1945, box 57. A year later, Stephen Corey made the same suggestion. Hutchins replied with, "How would you like to speak to Mr. Redfield about reviving the communications group?" Stephen Corey to Hutchins, October 18, 1945, and Hutchins to Corey, October 27, 1945, folder Communications and Public Opinion, Committee on, 1942-1945, box 57, OOP.

<sup>83</sup> For the wider field, see Pooley, "The Remobilization of the Propaganda and Morale Network, 1947-1953," *MediaArXiv* (working paper), March 30, 2019.

<sup>84</sup> The funding appeal was directed to Tyler, then SSRC chair. Berelson, noting that he is on the Inventory's faculty committee, reported that Wirth is "sympathetic to the conduct of communication research within the Inventory." The initiative, he added, "represent[s] the single best avenue for field research in communication problems now available." Berelson to Tyler and Clarence Faust, "Research program in communications and immediate needs for assistance," October 16, 1946, folder 1, box 173, EWB, 1-3.

to buttress central values in the long run—to “rationalize minor discordant options into harms with major (‘basic’) opinions.”<sup>86</sup>

By the fall Berelson’s committee-to-form-a-committee had produced a full-fledged proposal. “There is hardly an area of human life,” the report proclaimed, “in which the media of communication do not represent an important influence.” The document provided a capsule history of the field, noting its “isolated beginnings in several disciplines.” The field is now on the cusp of theoretical integration, building on a decade of empirical findings. Harvard, Michigan, North Carolina, Yale, Iowa, and California, the proposal reported, are all busy building programs or sponsoring research. None of them, however, has established a “broadly-conceived, long-range, well-integrated program of teaching and research of the scope proposed here for the University of Chicago.”<sup>87</sup>

The program’s scope was, in at least one sense, broadly conceived, aiming to cover not just mass media but also “the private medium of conversation.” At the same time, the field was defined in the familiar short-run effects frame established in the run-up to war: “The major factors in terms of which the field of communication studies has developed,” the proposal states, “are summarized in the formulation: *who says what to whom, how, and what effect.*” Each of the factors interests the new program, but (the proposal continued) the Committee is “inclined to give major emphasis to the last of these”—that is, to effects. The document, along similar lines, ruled out “literary or linguistic or philosophical problems in communication.” This was to be a social science program, through and through—with the accent on the quantitative methods refined in the war.<sup>88</sup>

Berelson’s proposal made a point to stress the field’s—and the proposed Committee’s—unusual and constitutive interdisciplinarity. The program’s teaching, the report stated, will draw on the full spread of social science departments, while its research program is “best organized in terms of broad problem areas rather than traditional departmental divisions.” In this respect, the proposal added, Chicago is especially well-suited to the field, given the university’s “deserved reputation for inter-departmental collaboration.”<sup>89</sup>

In these and other respects, the proposed program was faithful to its 1942 predecessor. As before, the plan was to support, at least initially, departmental master’s and doctoral programs, providing major and minor fields of specialization. Coursework, likewise, would be drawn from existing offerings, with the prospect for a handful of new courses. As with the first committee, finally, Berelson’s proposal indicated that the new program would seek to appoint dedicated faculty.

<sup>85</sup> The members of the “1946-1947 faculty seminar on the field of communication” are, unfortunately, nowhere listed. University of Chicago Committee on Communication Final Report, February 1948, folder 9, box 25, Morris Janowitz Papers, Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library [MJP hereafter], 35.

<sup>86</sup> Faculty Committee on Communication, “Preliminary Report of the Sub-committee on Communication and Public Opinion,” January 23, 1947, folder 11, box 25, MJP.

<sup>87</sup> Communication Committee of the University of Chicago Tentative Report, October 1947, folder 8, box 33, EWB. A slightly revised proposal was completed in February 1948. University of Chicago Committee on Communication Final Report, February 1948, folder 9, box 25, MJP.

<sup>88</sup> Tentative Report, October 1947.

<sup>89</sup> The proposal cited the Committees on Planning, Human Development, Human Relations in Industry, and Race Relations. Hutchins’ Commission on the Freedom of the Press, which had recently released its reports, was also quoted to support the Committee’s formation. Tentative Report, October 1947.

If there was a departure from Waples's unrealized original, it was tonal: Berelson's proposal is lathered in democracy talk. The first Committee's distress calls for engineered consent and opinion control were, in this postwar interregnum, replaced by the role media might play in a healthy democratic society.<sup>90</sup> Even popular culture, nearly absent from the first Committee's agenda, is here granted pride of research place.

The Committee won official approval from the Division of Social Sciences in the spring.<sup>91</sup> This time around, Ralph Tyler—by then the division's acting dean—was an advocate for the Committee. He nominated Berelson as chair, and proposed its other members: Waples, recently returned to campus; sociologists Herbert Goldhamer and Shils; political scientists Sebastian de Grazia and Avery Leiserson; marketing professor George H. Brown; and Tyler himself.<sup>92</sup>

In a memo to Hutchins, Tyler urged Hutchins to honor what he claimed were the university's commitments to the new Committee: five dedicated faculty to be hired over five years, three graduate fellowships, space, and a full-time secretary. Committee members should, he added, be granted teaching and research time away from their home departments.<sup>93</sup> Hutchins agreed to the Committee appointments, with the exception of Leiserson, but pushed back on Tyler's other demands. The Committee, he announced, will be staffed by existing faculty, and rely on "existing facilities, space and secretarial help." Any new expenditures would need to be raised by the Committee itself.<sup>94</sup> Thus the second Committee on Communication was, like the first, erected on a weak foundation, in both absolute terms and relative to other committees established around the same time.

The Committee's kickoff event, a monthlong "Seminar on Communication and Public Opinion," exemplified its cross-disciplinary ambitions: The Seminar's 11 sessions were co-sponsored by "several parts of the University interested in the field," including the Departments of Political Science, Psychology, and Sociology. The sessions featured a familiar roster of participants, such as Merton, Lazarsfeld (twice), Hans Speier, and Stouffer.<sup>95</sup>

In the early years, Berelson, Waples, Shils, de Grazia, Goldhamer, and Morris Janowitz were the Committee's active members. Waples, who had served in an array of propaganda agencies during the war, had recently returned to Chicago after three years in occupied Germany working on propaganda for the U.S. Army.<sup>96</sup> Janowitz, a sociologist who had served alongside Shils in the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) of Eisenhower's Allied command, was appointed to the Committee during its first operational year.<sup>97</sup> The others were all well-known to one another: De Grazia, Berelson, Shils, and Gold-

<sup>90</sup> Tentative Report, October 1947, 25.

<sup>91</sup> Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Division of the Social Sciences, April 7, 1948, folder Communication, Committee on, 1948-1950, box 57, OOP.

<sup>92</sup> Tyler to E. C. Colwell, July 6, 1948, folder Communication, Committee on, 1948-1950, box 57, OOP. On his return, Waples successfully negotiated for the title "Professor of Communication," which, he later claimed, made him the country's first.

<sup>93</sup> Tyler to E. C. Colwell, July 6, 1948.

<sup>94</sup> E. C. Colwell to Tyler, July 1948, folder Communication, Committee on, membership, 1948, box 57, OOP.

<sup>95</sup> Lazarsfeld was, according to the program, a visitor professor that 1949 fall. Seminar on Communication and Public Opinion, folder 8, box 33, EWB.

<sup>96</sup> Kamberelis and Albert, "Douglas Waples (1893-1978)," 254.

<sup>97</sup> Janowitz was appointed a half-time Research Associate position with the Committee. Berelson to Philip Hauser, September 28, 1948, folder 1, box 173, EWB.

hamer were all Chicago graduate students before the war; Shils and Goldhamer had shared an office. De Grazia, Berelson, and Shils each served at the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service early in the war. In 1943 De Grazia and Shils had moved to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor to the CIA, before Shils joined Janowitz (and other once and future communication scholars) at the PWD in the war's last year.<sup>98</sup>

The Committee's core members—Berelson and the others—taught the vast majority of the program's dedicated classes in these early years. About a dozen courses were offered, including de Grazia's *Theory and Principles of Communications*, Goldhamer's *Communication and Social Solidarity* and a Shils-Berelson offering on *Standards of Performance for Communication Media*.<sup>99</sup> The Cold War context was registered in Waples's regular courses, *Psychological Warfare and Strategic Intelligence* and *International Communication*—the latter organized around the need to “meet the Soviet promotion of international discords with all the strength the arts of persuasion can muster.”<sup>100</sup> Alexander George, a political science doctoral student who had served alongside Berelson, Shils, and Speier in a variety of wartime propaganda posts, also offered an annual course.

There were, in the late 1940s, intellectual collaborations among the Committee's members. Shils and Janowitz wrote up their PWD work in a prominent 1948 paper, and also collaborated with psychologist Bruno Bettelheim, a PWD colleague who Tyler had recruited to Chicago.<sup>101</sup> Berelson, in this period, turned to Shils for intellectual advice, a role that Shils would perform for Berelson throughout the 1950s.<sup>102</sup> There were, however, no major projects hatched in the Committee. Goldhamer and de Grazia were not working on communication topics, and Waples had, for the most part, stopped publishing. Shils was spending half the year at the London School of Economics, and Berelson—who maintained an active affiliation with Lazarsfeld's Bureau—was also running the Library School.<sup>103</sup>

There was one significant joint undertaking: Berelson and Janowitz collaborated on a teaching collection for the new field, published in 1950 as the *Reader in Public Opinion and Communication*. At the time, communication research had no textbook—the promised Lazarsfeld-Berelson project never got off the ground. As a result, courses around the country tended to rely, instead, on the handful of readers published in the late 1940s.<sup>104</sup> The Berelson and Janowitz collection was the latest offering in this mold, with an Advisory Board populated by a familiar cast: Lasswell, Lazarsfeld, Waples, and Speier, among others.<sup>105</sup> In their brief introduction, Berelson and Janowitz position the field in familiar terms, as a social science birthed in World War II. “After the war this growing interest led to the establishment of ad-

<sup>98</sup> Among the other important scholars at the PWD were Daniel Lerner, W. Phillips Davison, Jerome Bruner, and John Riley.

<sup>99</sup> The other regular instructors were David Riesman and Ruel Denny, both then at the undergraduate college, who taught a course on popular culture. Division of the Social Sciences, Sessions of 1949 | 1950, *University of Chicago Announcements*, July 1, 1949, 95–98; Division of the Social Sciences, Sessions of 1950 | 1951, *University of Chicago Announcements*, July 20, 1950, 19–21; and Division of the Social Sciences, Sessions of 1951 | 1952, *University of Chicago Announcements*, June 15, 1951, 16–19.

<sup>100</sup> Syllabus: *International Communication*, June 19, 1951, folder 7, box 175, EWB; and Syllabus: *Social Science 494: Psychological Warfare and Strategic Intelligence*, fall 1951, folder 13, box 175, EWB.

<sup>101</sup> Shils and Janowitz's 1948 paper on their PWD work was a quick classic in communication research, and helped refine the challenge-and-urgency framework by emphasizing the propaganda-resistant resilience of small groups in particular. Shils and Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 12, no. 2 (1948). On Shils's role in Bettelheim's and Janowitz's *Dynamics of Prejudice* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1950), see xviii. Bettelheim served on the Committee on Communication's Advisory Board.

<sup>102</sup> Pooley, “Fifteen Pages that Shook the Field,” 23n19.

<sup>103</sup> Berelson was, at the time, directing the Bureau study of the 1948 presidential election that would get published as Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).



ditional university centers for the study of public opinion and communication by the methods of social science," they wrote. "Together with the continuing activities of industry and government, they now represent a large scale research enterprise." The reader itself, while dominated by contributions from the propaganda-and-morale fraternity, is comparatively capacious, with selections from, for example, Robert Park and Theodor Adorno.<sup>106</sup>

Whatever momentum the Committee generated in the late 1940s had, by the early 1950s, stalled. The main reason, in yet another echo of the first Committee, was the call to war service. In 1950 Goldhamer left for Hans Speier's Social Science Division at the military-affiliated RAND Corporation, where he would work alongside his graduate school friend Nathan Leites. Alexander George, the political science student, had already taken up part-time work at RAND in 1948; by 1952 he too had stopped teaching for the Committee. Shils himself was working on a RAND commission, beginning in 1949, to study the Soviet military, the same year he took a semester at Harvard to work with Talcott Parsons on the Carnegie-funded Project on Theory.<sup>107</sup> When he returned to Chicago full time in 1952, he was no longer affiliated with the Committee. Janowitz, meanwhile, left for Michigan in 1951, where he turned his attention to military sociology.

The most significant departure, by far, was Berelson's. Speier was, as I have recounted elsewhere, the key figure in Berelson's move to the Ford Foundation. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Speier was, among many other things, Ford's most important social science consultant. Berelson, back in 1941, had briefly worked for Speier's New School project on totalitarian communications; the two were reunited the next year when Speier joined the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service—where he became close, too, with Shils. Berelson and Speier remained in postwar contact. When Ford's new Behavioral Sciences Program needed a leader, Speier quickly settled on Berelson. In 1951, the Committee on Communication lost its founding chair.<sup>108</sup>

At Berelson's departure, Waples was named the Committee's new chair. The appointment came with a significant change: Waples moved out of the Library School for a dedicated affiliation with the Committee. At the same time, a political science graduate student, Kenneth Adler, was named Instructor in Communication. Over the next five years, Waples and Adler jointly ran the program, with Adler attending to its day-to-day administration. The Committee doubled its official membership to 16, but none of its new members—with the partial and interesting exception of sociologist David Riesman—was much involved.<sup>109</sup>

Under Waples and Adler, the Committee devolved into an isolated backwater. The pair taught most of the courses, while also struggling

<sup>104</sup> Lyman Bryson, the educationalist and Seminar participant, published a 1948, and the energetic Wilbur Schramm published two more, in 1948 and 1949. The third installment of Lazarsfeld and Frank Stanton's Radio/Communication series, appearing in 1949, served a similar role. Bryson, *The Communication of Ideas* (New York: Institute for Religious and Social Studies, 1948); Schramm, *Communications in Modern Society: Fifteen Studies of the Mass Media* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1948); Schramm, *Mass Communications: A Book of Readings* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1949); and Stanton and Lazarsfeld, *Communication Research 1948-1949* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949).

<sup>105</sup> The other Board members were all veterans of World War II service: the sociologist W. Phillips Davison, the *Public Opinion Quarterly* editor and an OSS veteran; Chicago sociologist Clyde Hart, an OWI veteran; Merton; and political scientist Peter Odegard, who had served in the Treasury on the war-bond sales drive.

<sup>106</sup> Berelson and Janowitz, "Introduction," in *Reader in Public Opinion and Communication*, ed. Berelson and Janowitz (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1950), ix.

<sup>107</sup> See Joel Isaac, "Theorist at Work: Talcott Parsons and the Carnegie Project on Theory, 1949-1951," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 71, no. 2 (2010): 301.

<sup>108</sup> Pooley and Mark Solovey, "Marginal to the Revolution: The Curious Relationship between Economics and the Behavioral Sciences Movement in Mid-Twentieth-Century America," in *The Unsocial Social Science? Economics and Neighboring Disciplines since 1945*, ed. Roger E. Backhouse and Philippe Fontaine (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 204. Hutchins left for Ford the same year, where he proved to be a vocal critic of the behavioral sciences program.

<sup>109</sup> Division of the Social Sciences, Sessions of 1952 | 1953 and 1953 | 1954, *University of Chicago Announcements*, June 30, 1952, 20.

to secure small internal grants for their research.<sup>110</sup> Waples, who remained obsessed with clandestine psychological warfare, spent these years promising a unified theory of international communication, which he never produced. Kurt Lang, a sociology student, briefly worked with Waples on a German content-analysis project in 1952. The Committee, he recalled, “had lost a lot of its drive. [...] Not a great deal was going on.” Waples, he added, was “past his prime, no longer had the strength [...] to provide really leadership.” The Committee, Lang said, “existed mostly pro forma.”<sup>111</sup>

Waples and Adler, nevertheless, managed to establish a master’s program in 1954, after which the Committee took on a student-oriented character.<sup>112</sup> By all appearances, Adler worked hard to maintain the trappings of graduate-school normalcy, overseeing a student-produced newsletter, a colloquium, and an annual dinner.

The Committee’s main ties, in this period, were with political science, and not sociology. Sociologists, of courses, had contributed to the program from its earliest years, including Riesman, Shils, and Janowitz—none of whom, however, were members of the graduate department at the time. The anthropologist Lloyd Warner taught a regular course for the program, though he too operated at a remove from his fellow sociology department members. Of the department’s core members at the time, only Donald Horton contributed regularly to the Committee’s teaching, but otherwise kept his distance. Wirth and Blumer were never involved. The Committee was occasionally mentioned in a year-long, soul-searching sequence of meetings the department held in 1951 and 1952, but with no apparent follow-through.<sup>113</sup>

It was only in the mid-1950s that the Department’s sociologists got involved. Riesman, who had taught popular culture for the Committee since its inception, was the key enabling figure. In 1954 he joined the then-struggling department from the undergraduate college, and set about recruiting Lazarsfeld’s students. Riesman helped engineer the hiring of Elihu Katz (1955), Peter Rossi (1956), and James Coleman (1957), joining Peter Blau (1954)—a “parade of junior hires from Columbia,” in Andrew Abbott’s words, helping to tilt the department in a quantitative direction more in tune with the Committee’s effects orientation.<sup>114</sup> Rolf Meyersohn, yet another Columbia PhD, arrived in 1955 to direct the university’s Center for the Study of Leisure. Katz, Meyersohn, and Riesman, in particular, were active in the Committee’s master’s program, though Riesman soon left for Harvard. After Waples’s retirement in 1957, Coleman was named chair, and presided over the Committee’s dismantling.<sup>115</sup>

Waples’s departure sealed the Committee’s fate. Adler left with him, and the administration quickly decided to shutter the program.

<sup>110</sup> See, for example, Adler to Chauncey Harris, March 23, 1955, folder 1, box 173, EWB.

<sup>111</sup> To Lang’s astonishment, Waples had asked him to offer a seminar for the Committee, which showed “how short-handed they were.” Lang: “And I really don’t know anybody at the time—and it may just be lack of knowledge on my part—who actually got a degree in communication. It was just a loose affiliation of people who shared some kind of interest.” Peter Simonson, interview of Kurt Lang, October 13, 2007, <https://outofthequestion.org/>

<sup>112</sup> Graduate Programs in the Divisions, for Sessions of 1954 | 1955, *University of Chicago Announcements*, June 10, 1954, 214–15.

<sup>113</sup> Horton and Blumer, at one meeting, briefly discussed a jointly taught “seminar on communication.” The group’s final report, “Prospects for the Department of Sociology,” referred to the Committee in passing, noting that the department’s strengths in the communication and public opinion “need to be systematically exploited for the development of this area.” See folders 2–4, box 33, EWB. For an excellent account of the meetings, see Andrew Abbott, *Department & Discipline: Chicago Sociology at One Hundred* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 62–77.

<sup>114</sup> Abbott, *Department & Discipline*, 53–55.

<sup>115</sup> Walter Yondorf, “Special Meeting,” February 28, 1958, folder 22, box 172, EWB.

By early 1958 the Committee—not yet a decade old—had been ordered to wind down its operations and teach out its final degrees.<sup>116</sup> Adler’s replacement, Walter Yondorf, was another graduate student in political science. Under Coleman’s nominal supervision, Yondorf settled the Committee’s affairs, arranging to transfer its papers to sociology, which also agreed to accept students interested in the field. In the spring of 1959 the Committee closed for good.

Berelson, who returned to Chicago in the fall of 1957, might have saved the Committee.<sup>117</sup> He had, however, just endured the humiliating end to his Behavioral Sciences Program, which Ford trustees had closed in the wake of attacks from Congressional conservatives. At Ford, Berelson had generously seeded communication research. Building the field—his own, the one he had identified with since the early 1940s—had been among his top priorities. He left Ford embittered, however, and declined to renew his affiliation with the Committee upon his return to Chicago. He took the title Professor of the Behavioral Sciences, and devoted himself to a Carnegie-funded study of graduate education.<sup>118</sup>

Waples, from retirement, pleaded with Berelson to save the Committee; Waples enlisted Yondorf in the campaign, to no avail.<sup>119</sup> Berelson’s only involvement with the Committee was a talk to the student-organized Communication Club. Berelson delivered his remarks, on “The State of Communication Research,” on March 6, 1958.<sup>120</sup> The talk came just a week after the university had voted to close the Committee—though it’s doubtful that the students gathered in Social Science 201 knew about the vote.

Berelson began: “My theme is that, as for communication research, the state is withering away.”

## 5. Conclusion

After his appointment to the Committee of Communication in 1951, Kenneth Adler began writing to other communication programs, all over North America. He wanted to learn, he explained, how their programs are structured. He wrote to Harvard, to Columbia, to Toronto; he reached out to MIT and New York University. From some, like Columbia, he received a list of courses. MIT replied with a long list of publications, while Toronto apologized for the field’s tiny, informal imprint at the university. The secretary of Harvard’s Social Relations program replied that the “Department has little to offer in the field of Communication as such.”<sup>121</sup>

Adler, the Committee’s de facto administrator, also wrote to a handful of Midwestern state universities, including Illinois, Iowa State, Michigan State, and Wisconsin. These schools sent back thick

<sup>116</sup> Yondorf, “Special Meeting.”

<sup>117</sup> In a January 1958 letter, Waples nodded to a February meeting set to decide the Committee’s fate. “In case large new funds do not suddenly appear the following choices seem to be under consideration: 1. In case Lazarsfeld comes to university and expresses an interest in this committee, and in case Berelson is also willing to working the the [sic] committee, it may be continued. 2. If these two gentlemen do not express the necessary interest the committee will probably be discontinued at the end of this academic year or at the end of the next.” Lazarsfeld, who the university had tried to recruit at least two other times over the 1950s, did not leave Columbia; and Berelson did not intervene. Waples to [unknown], January 20, 1958, folder 7, box 173, EWB.

<sup>118</sup> The published report made no mention of communication research. Berelson, *Graduate Education in the United States* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).

<sup>119</sup> See, e.g., Waples to Walter Yondorf, January 23, 1958, folder 7, box 173, EWB, 2; and Yondorf to Waples, February 14, 1958, folder 7, box 173.

<sup>120</sup> Communication Club flyer, March 6, 1958, folder 22, box 172, EWB.

<sup>121</sup> The letters and replies are collected in folders 3–21, box 172, EWB. On the Harvard reply, see Eleanor Sprague to Adler, November 20, 1951, folder 6, box 172, EWB.

catalogs, touting their abundant offerings, large faculties, and doctoral degrees. Most of the programs, bearing the name “Mass Communication,” were housed in their university’s journalism school. Despite the professional school setting, the programs betrayed no meaningful intellectual difference from Chicago’s own. They were oriented to the same quantitative social science of persuasion, and their faculty—the social scientists, at least—had embraced the “behavioral sciences” moniker with vanguardist pride. Many of the them, including Illinois’s Wilbur Schramm, were hardened Cold Warriors in Waples’s mold, willing adjuncts to the national security state.

The only obvious departure from Chicago was the range of coursework: Classes on magazine editing and public relations appeared alongside more familiar offerings like research methods. The program bulletins, however, didn’t spell out what was the key difference: The journalism schools that hosted the mass communication doctorates were supported by hordes of careerist undergraduates. The new communication research, as an organized would-be discipline, was insecure, aspirational, and flush.

Berelson would go on to publish his 1958 eulogy for the field, delivered first to his erstwhile Committee’s students, in the *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Schramm, by then at Stanford, wrote an invited reply. An English PhD, Schramm—after encountering the interdisciplinary field in war service—had set out to build an organized discipline. Through sheer entrepreneurial pluck and some allied faculty in journalism schools, he had largely succeeded.

In his published reply to Berelson, Schramm cited his own frenetic day as evidence of the field’s vitality. He had just returned from a doctoral exam, had lunch with a pair of professors, and was off to attend a seminar with “scholars from eight countries.” It’s true, he wrote, that the field’s “founding fathers” were “truly remarkable,” but not all has been quiet in their footsteps. Their greatness may lie, not in what they did, but in “what they got started.”<sup>122</sup>

Berelson’s corpse, to Schramm, seemed full of life.

<sup>122</sup> Schramm, “Comments,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (1959): 6–9.

### *Archival Collections*

- EWB: Ernest Watson Burgess Papers, Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library
- MJP: Morris Janowitz Papers, Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library
- OOP: Office of the President, Hutchins Administration, Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library
- OVP: Office of the Vice-President 1937-1946, Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library
- RFR: Rockefeller Foundation Records, Rockefeller Archive Center
- RWT: Ralph W. Tyler Papers, Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago
- UCP: University of Chicago Press Records, 1892-1965, Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library

### *Bibliography*

- Berelson, Bernard. "The Effects of Print on Public Opinion." PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1941.
- Berelson, Bernard. "The Effects of Print upon Public Opinion." In *Print, Radio and Film in a Democracy*, edited by Douglas Waples, 41-65. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942.
- Berelson, Bernard. "The State of Communication Research." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (1959): 1-5. <https://doi.org/10.1086/266840>.
- Berelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee. *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954.
- Berelson, Bernard, and Morris Janowitz. "Introduction." In *Reader in Public Opinion and Communication*, edited by Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz, ix-xi. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1950.
- Berelson, Bernard, and Morris Janowitz, eds. *Reader in Public Opinion and Communication*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1950.
- Berelson, Bernard. *Graduate Education in the United States*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960.
- Bessner, Daniel. *Democracy in Exile: Hans Speier and the Rise of the Defense Intellectual*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018.
- Bettelheim, Bruno, and Morris Janowitz. *Dynamics of Prejudice: A Psychological and Sociological Study of Veterans*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1950.

- Bryson, Lyman, ed. *The Communication of Ideas*. New York: Institute for Religious and Social Studies, 1948.
- Buxton, William J. "The Political Economy of Communications Research." In *Information and Communication in Economics*, edited by Robert E. Babe, 147–75. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994.
- Converse, Jean M. *Survey Research in the United States: Roots and Emergence 1890–1960*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.
- Crowther-Heyck, Hunter. "Patrons of the Revolution: Ideals and Institutions in Postwar Behavioral Science." *Isis* 97, no. 3 (2006): 420–46. <https://doi.org/10.1086/508075>.
- Dzuback, Mary Ann. *Robert M. Hutchins: Portrait of an Educator*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
- Gary, Brett. "Communication Research, the Rockefeller Foundation, and Mobilization for the War on Words." *Journal of Communication* 46, no. 3 (1996): 124–47. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1996.tb01493.x>.
- Isaac, Joel. "Theorist at Work: Talcott Parsons and the Carnegie Project on Theory, 1949–1951." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 71, no. 2 (2010): 287–311. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jhi.0.0079>.
- Jaworski, Gary D. "Goffman's Interest in Spies and Espionage: The University of Chicago Context." *Symbolic Interaction* 44, no. 2 (2021): 392–411. <https://doi.org/10.1002/symb.498>.
- Kamberelis, George, and Marta K. Albert. "Douglas Waples (1893–1978): Crafting the Well-Read Public." In *Shaping the Reading Field: The Impact of Early Reading Pioneers, Scientific Research, and Progressive Ideas*, edited by Susan E. Israel and E. Jennifer Monaghan, 247–77. Newark, DE: International Reading Association, 2007.
- Katz, Elihu, and Paul F. Lazarsfeld. *Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1955.
- Kornhauser, Arthur W. "Chicago Surveys Concerning the Public's Beliefs and Desires about the War." *The Journal of Social Psychology* 18, no. 2 (1943): 371–82. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00224545.1943.9918791>.
- Lasswell, Harold D. *Propaganda Technique in the World War*. New York: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Company, 1927.
- Lasswell, Harold D. *Democracy Through Public Opinion*. New York: George Banta, 1941.
- Lasswell, Dwight D. "Communications Research and Politics." In *Print, Radio and Film in a Democracy*, edited by Douglas Waples, 101–17. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942.
- Lasswell, Harold D. "The Structure and Function of Communica-

- tion in Society." In *The Communication of Ideas*, edited by Lyman Bryson, 37–51. New York: Institute for Religious and Social Studies, 1948.
- Lazarsfeld, Paul F. *Radio and the Printed Page: An Introduction to the Study of Radio and Its Role in the Communication of Ideas*. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1940.
- Lazarsfeld, Paul F. "The Effects of Radio on Public Opinion." In *Print, Radio and Film in a Democracy*, edited by Douglas Waples, 66–78. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942.
- Lazarsfeld, Paul F., Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet. *The People's Choice: How The Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign*. New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1944.
- "News and Notes." *American Political Science Review* 25, no. 1 (1931): 158–70. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1946580>.
- Pooley, Jefferson, and Mark Solovey. "Marginal to the Revolution: The Curious Relationship between Economics and the Behavioral Sciences Movement in Mid-Twentieth-Century America." In *The Unsocial Social Science? Economics and Neighboring Disciplines since 1945*, edited by Roger E. Backhouse and Philippe Fontaine, 199–233. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010.
- Pooley, Jefferson. "Fifteen Pages That Shook the Field: *Personal Influence*, Edward Shils, and the Remembered History of Mass Communication Research." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 608, no. 1 (2006): 130–56. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716206292460>.
- Pooley, Jefferson. "The New History of Mass Communication Research." In *The History of Media and Communication Research: Contested Memories*, edited by David W. Park and Jefferson Pooley, 43–70. New York: Peter Lang, 2008.
- Pooley, Jefferson. "A 'Not Particularly Felicitous' Phrase: A History of the 'Behavioral Sciences' Label." *Serendipities. Journal for the Sociology and History of the Social Sciences* 1, no. 1 (2016): 38–81. <https://doi.org/10.7146/serendipities.v1i1.122862>.
- Pooley, Jefferson. "The Remobilization of the Propaganda and Morale Network, 1947–1953." *MediArXiv* (working paper), March 30, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.33767/osf.io/g9rp4>.
- Pooley, Jefferson. "What Were the Behavioral Sciences?" *SocArXiv* (working paper), December 17, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/7pxyv>
- Rajagopal, Arvind. "Communicationism: Cold War Humanism." *Critical Inquiry* 46, no. 2 (2020): 353–80. <https://doi.org/10.1086/706683>.
- Richardson, John V. *The Spirit of Inquiry: The Graduate Library School at Chicago, 1921–51*. Chicago: American Library Association, 1982.
- Schramm, Wilbur. *Communications in Modern Society: Fifteen Studies of*



- the Mass Media*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1948.
- Schramm, Wilbur, ed. *Mass Communications: A Book of Readings*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1949.
- Schramm, Wilbur. "Comments." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (1959): 6–9.
- Shils, Edward A., and Morris Janowitz. "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 12, no. 2 (1948): 280–315. <https://doi.org/10.1086/265951>.
- Sills, David. "Bernard Berelson: Behavioral Scientist." *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 17 (1981): 305–11.
- Smith, Mark C. *Social Science in the Crucible: The American Debate over Objectivity and Purpose, 1918–41*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994.
- Sproule, J. Michael. "Propaganda Studies in American Social Science: The Rise and Fall of the Critical Paradigm." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 73 (1987): 60–78. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00335638709383794>.
- Sproule, J. Michael. *Propaganda and Democracy: The American Experience of Media and Mass Persuasion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Stanton, Frank N., and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, eds. *Communication Research 1948–1949*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949.
- Stouffer, Samuel A. "A Sociologist Looks at Communications." In *Print, Radio and Film in a Democracy*, edited by Douglas Waples, 133–46. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942.
- Tyler, Ralph W. "Implications of Communications Research for the Public Schools." In *Print, Radio and Film in a Democracy*, edited by Douglas Waples, 149–58. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942.
- Wahl-Jørgensen, Karin. "How Not to Found a Field: New Evidence on the Origins of Mass Communication Research." *Journal of Communication* 54 (2004): 547–64. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460>
- Waples, Douglas. "The Graduate Library School at Chicago." *Library Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (1931): 26–36. <https://doi.org/10.1086/612842>.
- Waples, Douglas. "Do We Want a Library Science? A Reply." *Library Journal*, 56, no. 15 (1931): 743–46.
- Waples, Douglas. *People and Print: Social Aspects of Reading in the Depression*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938.
- Waples, Douglas. "Press, Radio and Film in the National Emergency." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 5, no. 3 (1941): 463–69.
- Waples, Douglas. "Introduction." In *Print, Radio and Film in a Democracy*, edited by Douglas Waples, v–xi. Chicago: University of



Chicago Press, 1942.

Waples, Douglas, ed. *Print, Radio and Film in a Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942.

Waples, Douglas. *On the March: A Short Autobiography for Friends Family*. Privately printed, 1967.

Waples, Douglas, Bernard Berelson, and Franklyn R. Bradshaw. *What Reading Does to People*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940.

Waples, Douglas, and Harold D. Lasswell. *National Libraries and Foreign Scholarship*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936.

Waples, Douglas, and Ralph W. Tyler. *What People Want to Read about: A Study of Group Interests and a Survey of Problems in Adult Reading*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931.